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The Myth of Agency and the Misattribution of Blame in Collective Imaginaries of the 
Future  
 
 
In her essay entitled “From Having to Being: Self-Worth and the Current Crisis of American 
Society,” Michèle Lamont presents a galvanizing discussion of possible ways that cultural 
sociologists might use our expertise to address the existential angst and widespread despair that 
seem to permeate American society today. The crux of her argument is that the American Dream 
is ineffective as a collective narrative, primarily because it focuses on a single criterion of 
success—material prosperity—which “dominates all other dimensions of human achievement.” 
We cannot all rise into the middle class, and in fact fewer of today’s young adults can do so than 
in previous generations, and thus Lamont laments that we are “dreaming an impossible dream” 
(Lamont 2019, p. 8). In response, she proposes that we should promote a broader set of cultural 
models of success, such that people will aspire to achieve not only material wealth (having) but 
also social connections and moral convictions (being).  
As I read this essay, I found myself nodding in affirmation with Lamont’s diagnosis of 
the psychological costs of the widespread failure of the American Dream, and I heartily agree 
that these problems are not only the result of structural barriers and material inequities but also 
stem from cultural processes. Yet, as a scholar who has examined the cultural correlates of 
education and the theoretical question of how shared ideals and future aspirations impact 
people’s lives in the present, I would like to propose here a slight modification of Lamont’s call 
to action. Youth today may be dreaming an impossible dream, but the element of the American 
Dream that is in my view most harmful to our collective wellbeing is not its optimistic (and to 
some degree unattainable) imagined destination, but rather its unrealistic account of the means 
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through which people can arrive there. Rather than working to promote a different set of aims, as 
Lamont suggests here, it may be more helpful to focus on a cultural reframing of the causal 
pathways connecting individuals’ present circumstances with later life outcomes, one that more 
directly recognizes the role played by institutional weakness, social discrimination, and the 
reproduction of inequality. Dominant cultural narratives locate these causal pathways in the 
actions or inactions of the individual aspirants, leaving the extra-individual forces that keep 
people from achieving their future goals to escape our collective gaze.  
I illustrate these points by drawing upon my research on young adults’ educational and 
career aspirations in Malawi and Uganda. My starting off point is thus where Lamont ends her 
essay—what she in her final sentence describes as “a whole new set of questions that are better 
left for another day” (2019, p. 43)—how cultural narratives of future success circulate in other 
international contexts. Looking beyond the local historical and political dynamics that undergird 
the American Dream, I show how collective myths about the future shape subjective experiences 
of unmet ambition in places where dashed hopes are even more rampant than they are in the 
contemporary United States. Drawing insights from the research that I have conducted over the 
past decade about the cultural myths surrounding educational expansion in sub-Saharan Africa, 
my goal is to add an international comparative perspective that will not only reveal some 
interesting contrasts between the American and African contexts, but also provide some more 
general clarifications and insights about the subject at hand: the role played by cultural myths in 
shaping the subjective experience of dashed hopes and stagnant economic trajectories. In other 
words, I hope to bring to this dialogue a bit of the comparative cultural sociology that Lamont 
has long championed (see, for example, Lamont and Thevanot 2000; Lamont 2012).  
 
 
The American Dream and the Misattribution of Blame  
As Lamont describes in her essay, the American Dream has four primary tenets: “1) equality of 
opportunity, so that the dream is perceived as accessible to all, 2) the hope of success, 3) the 
view that success results from actions and traits under one’s control, and 4) the belief that 
success is associated with virtue.” As this definition aptly conveys, what makes the American 
Dream cohere as a collective myth is not its account of what American youth aspire to, but rather 
its account of how a person achieves success: the architecture connecting present circumstances 
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to an imagined future. According to the American Dream, it is a person’s own effort and 
achievement—rather than where they come from, who they are, or the environment in which 
they are currently embedded—that largely determines whether or not they will succeed.  
Lamont advocates new “narratives of hope” that broaden the criteria of success beyond 
material resources and valorize types of success that are not resource dependent. The first two 
elements of these alternative narratives center on changing what success looks like, or how we 
define a life well lived. First, she envisions that we should work to “valoriz[e] social 
contributions that are not directly tied to production and consumption, such as caring, educating, 
consecrating, and other types of activities, without subordinating them or justifying them by 
profit maximization” (p. 32) And second, she advocates that we promote “ordinary universalism” 
or “valorize… what people believe all people have in common” (p. 30)1 Her third proposal, in 
contrast, focuses on our collective understandings of what causes success or failure: “removing 
blame in order to refute the notion that a specific group deserves their lot because of their 
behavior” (p. 31). This final recommendation comes closest to what I’m advocating for in this 
response.  
I share Michele’s conviction that we need to not only address structural inequities but 
also seek to shift our collective narratives about the future. Nonetheless, rather than changing our 
shared definition of a good life and promoting a more inclusive vision of what is valued, 
sociologists are best positioned to promote a more realistic understanding of how divergent 
trajectories happen: how some succeed and others fail to achieve shared visions of success. More 
specifically, we should work to increase social recognition of extra-individual constraints—
institutional weaknesses, systemic discrimination and deep-rooted inequality of opportunity—
into our shared understandings of what drives success in America. This will help to both 
contextualize experiences of failing to achieve one’s goals and potentially facilitate collective 
action aimed at reducing these structural barriers.  
This focus on destabilizing the false sense of self-propulsion underlying the American 
Dream and other dominant aspirational myths is also more consistent with what sociologists of 
culture can do best. The tools of cultural sociology ready us to shed light on moments when our 
cultural understandings are particularly at odds with objective reality (Frye 2017; Collins 2019; 
                                                 
1
 The repeated use of the verb “valorize” here reveals the extent to which these components rest on changing our 
shared criteria of what a successful future looks like, rather than on how one does or does not achieve this future 
vision of success. 
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Saguy 2012; Rosen 2017; Harding et al. 2017) and reveal how our shared cultural 
understandings shape our social relationships and life outcomes (Lamont et al. 2015; Polletta et 
al. 2011; Bail 2015). These tools are less helpful for promoting alternative cultural content.  
 
Secondary Students in Malawi: Irrational Agency Amidst Systemic Failure 
My first exposure to the empirical study of shared cultural narratives about the future took place 
in Malawi about a decade ago, in summer of 2008, when I asked a group of 40 female secondary 
students to describe what they imagined their adult lives would look like (Frye 2012). I 
encountered almost universal optimism: they imagined themselves attending university and 
securing jobs that many had never encountered in their own lives, including nurses, pilots, and 
engineers. In order to better understand the source of this surprising optimism, I compiled 
archival materials to analyze the ideological campaigns promoting formal education in Malawi 
surrounding the country’s abolition of primary school fees about a decade prior. In these 
documents, including newspaper articles, school curricula, and magazines and posters targeting 
rural youth, I encountered a cultural model that bears a striking resemblance to the American 
Dream that Lamont describes in her essay. As in the United States, I identified four elements that 
are culturally construed to jointly produce future success in Malawi: “ambitious career goals, 
sustained effort, unflagging optimism, and resistance to (mostly sexual) temptations” (Frye 2012, 
p. 1565).  
Similar to the American dream, this model promotes a causal sequence linking present 
circumstances with future outcomes that centers on the actions and inactions of the individual 
student. Work hard and be strong, the model promised, and you will succeed. Be lazy or allow 
yourself to be distracted along the way, and you will fail. This cultural model, in turn, led 
Malawian women to adopt a strikingly agentic perspective on their own futures, despite the fact 
that structural barriers and resource limitations permeated the educational system, such that 
fewer than one percent of students who begin primary school actually made it to university. This 
cultural model also led young women to interpret the experiences of those around them as signs 
of individual moral shortcomings rather than as indications of an inadequate opportunities and 
ineffective institutions. In other words, this model set Malawian youth up to interpret their 
almost inevitable inability to meet their ambitious aspirations as their own fault, in spite of 
widespread evidence to the contrary.  
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This self-attribution of blame and perceived agency is not inevitable; instead it is 
institutionally configured. The popular perception that individuals control their own destinies is 
convenient for schools and governments, because it promotes individual investment in 
institutional pathways for self-improvement while protecting these same institutions from blame 
when these pathways do not lead to the imagined outcomes. This self-attribution is a key 
mechanism for the legitimation of inequality in contemporary society:   
The achievement ideology . . . maintains that individual merit and achievement are the 
fair and equitable sources of inequality of American society. If merit is the basis for the 
distribution of awards, then members of the lower classes attribute their subordinate 
position in the social order to personal deficiencies. In this way, inequality is legitimated 
(MacLeod 2009, p. 113, emphasis added).  
 
In other words, this self-directed nature of our cultural myths both insulates institutions from 
blame for people’s widespread failure to realize their dreams and reinforces the myth that 
destinies are determined by people’s own effort and moral strength.  
 
University Graduates in Uganda: A Social Class Gradient of Self-Attribution  
Not only is this self-attribution not inevitable, it is also not universal. My more recent research, 
located in Kampala, Uganda, focuses on how university graduates navigate a context of 
widespread unemployment. This tendency to self-attribute failure to achieve aspirations is 
patterned by social class background, with disadvantaged youth being the most likely to 
internalize blame. The primary data for this ongoing data collection project consists of a set of 
longitudinal in-depth interviews with 60 men and women graduating from four universities 
across Kampala. I designed my sample to maximize variation in social class background, 
because I anticipated that as they left campus and began to look for work, students’ trajectories 
would diverge along classed lines; youth from more advantaged backgrounds would be more 
likely to find jobs and land on their feet, while disadvantaged youth would be more likely to 
remain unemployed for extended periods, deriving little material benefit from their university 
educations. But even before these divergent trajectories could be observed, a notable difference 
was apparent in their imagined futures when I first spoke with these youth a year ago, during 
their final semester on campus.  
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Across social class background, the destinations they envisioned were largely the same. 
Most respondents hoped to end up employed in offices or running successful businesses (or 
both), and they also wanted their careers to relate to their course of study and build upon the 
skills they developed while at campus. What differed along classed lines in these first-round 
interviews were the causal narratives linking their present circumstances with their imagined 
destinations. Among disadvantaged students, the primary narrative was one of institutionally-
supported self-actualization. These youth believed in the power of their credential—they 
expected that excelling in their coursework and achieving a university degree would give them 
the tools needed to achieve success. What was needed, in their view, was their own sustained 
effort, leading them to graduate at the top of their class, find relevant positions and apply to as 
many jobs as possible. This meritocratic narrative is supported by the “education for all” 
messages that these youth had received since they were young, having come of age during the 
period when school fees were eliminated first for primary students and then for secondary 
students (Omoeva and Gale 2016; Mundy 2017). Having taken advantage of these new 
educational opportunities and progressed as far as they had, this narrative avows, they already 
had the tools necessary to achieve success. The disconnect between the number of students 
graduating and the number of jobs available was explained by a lack of effort. While most 
university graduates are lazy and take their achievements for granted, as newcomers into the 
university scene, disadvantaged youth are equipped with an keen sense of how special their 
positions are and are prepared to work hard to capitalize on the opportunities they have been 
given.  
In contrast, respondents who come from a higher-class background express a causal 
narrative that emphasizes structural and institutional failures. Having come of age in a social 
environment in which most people around them attended university, they are acutely aware of 
how difficult it is to make the leap from degree to stable job. They have seen older siblings, 
family friends, and others around them fail due to the disorganization of the system. They tell 
stories about employers questioning the value of degrees due to rampant cheating and 
disfunction at universities. They describe observing people apply to hundreds of jobs, armed 
with a degree in a relevant field from a well-respected university, and not hear back from any of 
them. And most commonly, they speak of the extent to which the system of employment in 
Uganda is driven not by credentials and individual-level success but by social networks—it’s not 
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technical know-how but “technical know-who” that gets one a job in Uganda today (see also 
Reynolds Whyte et al. 2013). So, while they want the same futures that the disadvantaged youth 
envision, they express these futures as contingent on circumstances beyond their control.  
These different causal narratives have important implications for the experience of 
dashed hopes. Interviews I conducted with older graduates, who have already been out of 
university for a few years, reveal a similar pair of narratives. Graduates from disadvantaged 
backgrounds believe that the strongest determinant of success is one’s own effort, and they 
blame themselves for their nearly universal failure to secure stable employment. Graduates from 
more advantaged backgrounds, in contrast, believe that they system is rigged, and they are both 
less devastated by persistent unemployment and more likely to seek alternative means for 
gaining employment, most commonly relying on personal connections rather than educational 
credentials or the skills they developed in university.  
In her recent book examining cross-national differences in women’s understandings of 
work-family conflict, Caitlyn Collins (2019) demonstrates another example of cultural narratives 
that diverge primarily in terms of the extent to which outcomes are believed to be determined by 
the behavior or efforts of individuals alone or by extra-individual forces. Collins found that 
women’s career interests chafed with their childrearing identities in all four countries in which 
she conducted interviews, though to differing degrees. Yet across national contexts, mothers 
referenced different causes of this conflict. While in the United States, women blamed 
themselves and their inability to achieve “work-life balance;” Italian mothers blamed the state; 
Swedish mothers blamed their country’s unrealistic ideals for perfect equanimity between work 
and home life; and German mothers blamed outmoded cultural norms of motherhood (Collins 
2019). Just as a middle-class membership is unattainable for everyone, complete harmony 
between work and family life is also likely an impossible ideal, as evidenced by the fact that 
Collins documents conflict in even the countries with the most progressive work-family policies. 
Yet by blaming mothers themselves for their widespread failure to achieve (or even come close) 
to this ideal, instead of attributing this failure to the state or our collective understandings of 
motherhood, American cultural narratives of motherhood contribute to women’s isolation and 
dissatisfaction. And just as with our false myths of social mobility, cultural sociologists must 
work to reveal these harmful individualistic causal models and increase the social salience of the 
institutional and social mechanisms that shape mothers’ outcomes. 
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Reframing the Dream: Destabilizing the Myth of Agency and Exposing Extra-Individual 
Forces  
Returning to the American dream and today’s somewhat dystopian moment: Lamont is right, I 
believe, to characterize the American dream as overly materialistic. Would a wider set of popular 
images of success be helpful? No doubt. But material indicators of success are so deeply 
embedded in our capitalistic society that I fear that we have little hope of undermining their 
symbolic dominance. Neither are the materialistic preoccupations of contemporary American 
visions of success unusual, either from a temporal or geographic point of comparison. Eighty 
years ago, far before the neoliberal era, Merton (1938) was already decrying the fact that 
American society placed an exaggerated emphasis on the goal of monetary success. And a 
similarly materialistic focus of future aspirations can be found not only in sub-Saharan Africa, as 
I document in my research (Frye 2012), but also in other less developed contexts around the 
world (Lukose 2005; O’Dougherty 2002; de Koning 2009).  
Empirical evidence on social class differences in future aspirations also contributes to my 
skepticism that the promotion of alternative indicators of success is an effective conduit for the 
destigmatization of poverty. Specifically, studies from multiple contexts have shown that purely 
material indicators of success—such as a vacation house, expensive vehicle, or nice clothes—are 
more salient to the future imaginaries of poor youth compared with more advantaged youth 
(Brown et al. 2009; Chaplin, Hill, and John 2014). Yet despite this emphasis on material 
achievement in their descriptions of their own future aspirations, there is also evidence that poor 
youth may hold a wider set of outcomes that they define as respectable—as indicators of “a life 
well lived.” Drawing from his research on boys’ imagined futures in an urban setting in the 
United States, David Harding (2010) describes how poor youth often aspire to attend university, 
but when asked to describe their role models, they describe people who did not achieve the 
indicators of success they just referenced in regard to their own futures, but instead overcame 
hardships and achieved moral clarity in the face of challenging circumstances—Harding (2010, 
p. 19) terms this the “turnaround narrative.” These role models might be recovering addicts, 
fathers who have been in and out of prison, or youth who have involved themselves in gangs—a 
sharp contrast with the middle-class futures they themselves aspire to. In my own research in 
Uganda, I have found a similar pattern. When describing what they hope their future lives will 
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look like, respondents mention owning a car, having a fancy phone, and wearing tailored clothes. 
But in the same interviews, they speak with deep respect, even reverence, about relatives and 
childhood who had none of those symbols—they may have never been to school, but persevered 
through hardship and provided a stable home.  
Other research, examining the psychological effects of unrealized optimism, suggests that 
it is not the fact that most people’s dreams are irrationally ambitious that is harmful for social 
integration and personal wellbeing. John Reynolds and Chardie Baird (2010) show that 
American high school students who stated they expected to complete university and later failed 
to graduate from high school are no more likely to be depressed than their peers who expected 
less and reached the same level. Conditional on educational attainment, they find no 
psychological consequences of unrealized ambition. Reaching for the stars and falling short does 
not lead to depression.  
What makes the American Dream so destructive as a cultural myth is not that the 
destination—entry into the middle class and a more prosperous adulthood than their parents 
experienced—is distant and improbable for many who ascribe to this narrative. Instead, the 
problem is that in their imaginations, youth are responsible for not only driving the car but also 
for paving the road that leads to this destination; they are blamed for every barrier they encounter 
along the way. This myth of agency, I believe, is where we as cultural sociologists should focus 
most of our attention. The American Dream, along with other collective narratives that suggest 
that our success or failure hinge on our own actions, has the potential lead to despair, because it 
increases people’s self-blame and encroaches upon their ability to work together against the 
external barriers keeping them from realizing their dreams. If one believes that they control their 
own destiny in a context in which their dreams are improbable, they are susceptible not only to 
disappointment but also to self-blame and the internalization of structural inequity.  
By increasing our shared attention to the role played by social and institutional forces in 
shaping our divergent destinies, what I’m envisioning is a more pragmatic version of the 
American Dream, or the Education for All narrative, or any other optimistic vision of future 
success. Our collective imaginary about the future may still encourage everyone to reach high 
(whatever that means for them), but it must not pretend that some of us don’t start off higher than 
others, with a shorter distance to go and a sturdier ladder to support us. By challenging the myth 
of self-propulsion at the center of our shared narratives about the future, we can ameliorate some 
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of the personal shame that results from falling short of one’s ambitions. We should conduct more 
research that reveals the inaccuracies of our causal narratives about the future and explores how 
these false narratives persist despite widespread evidence that they are wrong. As cultural 
sociologists, this is our most powerful method of supporting collective action—likely the only 
force that can ultimately work—geared toward reducing the structural inequities and social 
barriers that make ambitious dreams harder to realize for some groups than others.  
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